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INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE

Multistate Branching and the
International Banking Act of 1977
CHARLES E. M. KOLB*
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the uncertainties created by the quintupling of oil prices in October 1973 was precisely what would happen to the enormous reserves of
petrodollars which Arab oil-exporting nations were expected to receive.
Second only to the problem of finding the revenues to finance continued oil
imports - a problem of acute importance for many non-oil producing
developing countries' - was the problem of rechanneling these funds
throughout world financial markets without triggering a destabilizing inflation or a widespread depression.' While all of these traumatic events were
shaking world money markets, the United States itself was adjusting to the
post-Watergate, post-Vietnam era in which many observers anticipated a
stage of emerging neo-isolationism. In terms of its relations abroad, the United States was beset with a number of complex problems: foreign oil cartels,
a Russian wheat sale gone sour, the much heralded yet unsuccessful "year of
Europe," rising competition from Japanese imports and the unraveling of a
series of sordid stories relating to improper CIA activities abroad and illegal
bribes made by U.S. corporate officers to obtain foreign contracts. In the
face of these overseas frustrations, U.S. policy-makers felt that the only way
of countering these disappointments was to exercise the economic leverage
wielded by the trillion dollar U.S. GNP.3 Thus, in late 1973, the summer
"farm boom" was followed by the creation of "new trade restrictions,"
most notably an export embargo on soybean shipments and other
foodstuffs.' Talk of reducing trade barriers waned and concern grew for the
protection of the national interest from foreign influences. William Diebold
has explained the attitude that seemed prevalent in the leading Western industrial democracies:
*J.D. candidate, 1978, University of Virginia; B.A. Honours, Balliel College, Oxford University, 1975; A.B. Princeton University, 1973. Mr. Kolb is the Editor-in-Chief of the Virginia
Journal of International Law, 1977-78.
i. See, Beim, Rescuing the LDCs. 55 Foreign Affairs 717 (1977); Cleveland & Brittain,
Are the LDCs in OVER their Heads? 55 Foreign Affairs 732 (1977); Levy, World Oil Cooporation or International Chaos, 52 Foreign Affairs 690 (1974).
2. See Levy, supra note 1, at 713.
3. Diebold, U.S. Trade Policy: The New Political Dimensions. 52 Foreign Affairs 472
(1974).

4. Id. at 481.
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Malaise and discontent, common to the industrial countries, made
governments and people focus on issues that seemed far more
urgent than the distant promise of good results from international
negotiations. The feeling grew that governments were rarely as
well occupied as when they were knitting up their raveled societies.
• . . For some people, nationalism took on a benign hue, while the
gains of past international cooperation were more or less taken for
granted.

5

Coincidental with these restrictive influences in U.S. trade practices came an
increased concern that the turmoil in world financial markets of 1974 and
1975, stemming from dollar instability due to recycled petrodollars, two major bank failures and large foreign exchange losses, required protective action at home. 6 The result was an increased legislative concern for the scope
of foreign banking activities in the United States. This concern found
legislative outlets in proposals submitted by the Federal Reserve Board (the
Fed) in 1974 and in the completion of the Financial Institutions and the Nation's Economy (FINE) Study in 1975. The latter identified some five areas
in which foreign banks operating branches, agencies, or subsidiaries in the
United States were deemed to have competitive advantages over domestic
banks.7
This essay will examine the claims of the FINE report and the Fed with
specific reference to the problem of multistate branching by foreign banks in
the United States. The discussion will be conducted within the context of the
contemporary Congressional debate over section 5 of the International
Banking Act of 1977.8
II.

U.S. INTERNATIONAL BANKING LEGISLATION

Congressional interest in regulating the U.S. activities of foreign banks
can be traced to 1967 and the failure of the New York affiliate of Intrabank,
a Lebanese bank. 9 Ten years ago the presence of foreign banking in the United States was not nearly as visible as it is today, in large part due to the fact
that the flow of funds was from the United States to foreign countries. Since
the early 1970s, however, the influx of foreign capital into the country has
been unprecedented. From November 1972 to May 1977 the "standard
banking assets" of foreign banks (exclusive of clearing balances and
balances from directly related institutions) has increased 1 / times, from
5. Id. at 480-81.
6. Guenther, Legislative Doldrums, 126 Banker 1143, 1143 (Oct. 1976).

7. Nevans, ForeignBanks in New York: The Great New Growth Centre, Euromoney 18, 51
(June 1977).

8. See text at pp.

infra.

9. Hendrickson, Will Congress Finally Crack Down on Foreign Banks? Institutional Investor 137, 137 (Sept. 1977).
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$18.3 billion to $50.5 billion.' 0 Business Week magazine reported in 1974
that foreign banks in this country underwent a sevenfold asset increase in
just eight years."I With Arab oil money being recycled through sophisticated
money markets in London and New York, and with substantial investments
being made in U.S. securities and real estate ventures," members of the
Federal Reserve Board and certain Congressmen became alarmed that the
inflow of Arab petrodollars might carry with it increased Arab political and
economic leverage which could jeopardize our national security."
Serious legislative activity began after the Federal Reserve Steering
Committee on International Banking developed a set of proposals in
February 1974 which would promote equality of treatment as to the
"regulation and supervision of foreign and domestic banks operating in this
country." 4 In early December 1974, the Fed sent legislation to the Congress
5
in light of the criticisms received in connection with its earlier proposals.'
This legislation became known as the Foreign Bank Act of 19746 and, due
to its late introduction in 1974, was reintroduced the following year as the
Foreign Bank Act of 1975." One commentator has described these
proposals as follows:
The Federal Reserve proposals represent a comprehensive and
coherent approach to regulatory reform which address each of the
major problems associated with the expansion of foreign banking
in the United States. The proposals are grounded in the principle
of non-discrimination and would achieve equality of treatment in
the regulation and supervision of foreign and domestic banks.
Further, the proposal would bring foreign banks within the purview of the central bank, increasing the efficiency of monetary
policy and making United States policies toward foreign banks
8
responsive to various foreign policy considerations."
This statement, in essence, reflects the major underlying premises of the
Fed's proposals; however, given the structural characteristics of the present
U.S. "dual" banking system, e.g., a system subject to both state chartering
provisions and federal regulation, it is apparent that the Fed's approach is
10. Terrell & Key, The U.S. Activities of Foreign Banks: An Analytic Survey (Oct. 6,

1977) 5. (Prepared for Conference on Key Issues in International Banking Sponsored by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, presented at Bald Peak Colony Club Melvin Village, N.H.)
11.The Fed's Drive to Regulate Foreign Banks, Business Week 61 (July 13, 1974).
12. Fretting Over Foreign Banking, Business Week 24 (Dec. 8, 1975).
13. Halperin, The Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United States. 9 Int'l Law. 661, 661
(1975).

14. Id. at 684.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id. at 687.
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neither "comprehensive" nor "coherent." Furthermore, as the legislation
has developed into the International Banking Acts of 1976 and 1977,"1
doubts have arisen as to whether the reasons alleged for having such regulations in the case of foreign banks in the United States are in fact justifiable
on either empirical or policy grounds. Furthermore, any proposal mandating membership in the Federal Reserve System would not only depart
from the present treatment accorded domestic state banks to which membership is optional, but also would detract from the Fed's articulated concerns for the promotion of "non-discrimination" and "equality of treatment." This essay's major premise is that while concern over domestic activities of foreign banks is timely, it does not provide the occasion for drastic
piecemeal alterations in the U.S. banking regulatory system. As will be explained in detail below, the necessary impact of the Fed's proposals concerning foreign banks would be a lessening of state prerogatives within the
current "dual" banking system. 2" Opponents of the International Banking
Act of 1977 suspect that granting the Fed increased power over the activities
of foreign banks will only serve as the prelude to the end of the present dual
banking system. 2 ' As Donald Platten, the Chairman of Chemical Bank, has
written, "[t]he need to promote national policy in the international arena
has clearly justified an increase in the Federal Reserve's involvement." 22 My
chief concern, however, is that passage of the International Banking Act of
1977 in its present form would create a reverse effect, whereby the Fed
would actually extend its alleged rationale for control over foreign banks
into a means for eventually establishing a national, unitary, federal banking
system. If a federal system is really what the Fed eventually wants, then
Congress should concentrate on legislation to restructure the entire system.
The present legislation has all of the drawbacks of a piecemeal approach
which attempts to deal with some problems while only making the overall
situation much worse. Nothing illustrates this situation better than the
proposed measures dealing with multistate branching of banks.

19. These bills are shown as H.R. 13876 and H.R. 7325 respectively.
20, For a general discussion of the U.S. "dual" banking system see J.White, Teaching

Materials on Banking Law 939-46 (1976).
21. This speculation has been openly voiced on a number of occasions and was stresed by
some of the participants in the Hearings Before the Subcommittee on FinancialInstitutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,

95th Cong., 1st Sess., July 12, 13, and 19, 1977 at 309, 374, 448, and 604 [hereinafter cited as
Hearings.
22. Platten, The Muterings of Nationalism Threaten America'sReal Interests, Euromoney
66, 68 (Oct. 1976).
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III.
A.

The problem

MULTISTATE BRANCHING

23

Under the present system of U.S.bank regulation, domestic banks are
not generally permitted to establish branches in other states. The McFadden
Act provides that a nationally chartered bank may branch, but only to the
extent that the law of the state in which it is located allows branching by a
state bank.2" The issue presented by branching regulation is crucial to the
presence of foreign banking institutions in this country since foreign banks
want access to capital markets which are now developing in regions other
than the traditional ones in the industrial northeast and on the West Coast.
From the domestic perspective, several states would clearly like to compete
for foreign funds which would then be invested in their own regional
development. Thus, as of 1975, ten states specifically authorized foreign
banks to operate within their borders.2" Ten others forbade such operations,26 and it can be assumed that in the remaining states having no legislation on the subject, foreign branch banking would not be permitted.27
In the absence of a national policy on the presence of foreign banks,
states are virtually free to do as they please in this area, and the outcry by
some small state banks has been that foreign banks enjoy a competitive advantage in U.S. financial markets not shared by domestic banks which are
confined to the state in which they are chartered. As Stuart Pittman, Counsel for the Institute of Foreign Bankers, has observed, "[Mjultistate
branching is the threshold issue without which foreign bank legislation
would not have gotten started."28 The obvious problem, of course, is that
states like California, Illinois and New York - states where major foreign
banks have chosen to do most of their U.S. branching - favor the current
absence of national regulation over foreign banks. Conversely, states less
successful in attracting foreign business have decried the absence of regulation as providing a competitive advantage to the foreign banks. To the extent that the United States favors a policy of (1)attracting foreign investment and (2) integrating world capital markets, the proper response to the
presence of foreign banks calls for liberalizing domestic prohibitions against
branching rather than restricting the operations of foreign banks in the United States to the state in which the foreign bank is initially chartered.
23. This essay will not discuss the general benefits and disadvantages of the varying
organizational forms in which foreign banks may operate in the United States, e.g. subsidiaries,
affiliates and branches. Several thorough presentations of this issue already exist and may be
found inJ. White, supra note 20 at 916-20 and Halperin, supra note 13 at 663-65.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
25. Halperin, supra note 13, at 666.
26. Id.

27. Id.
28. Hearings, supra note 21 at 470.
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B.

The Rationalefor Anti-branching rules

As of 1976, eighteen states allowed branching on a statewide basis;
twenty-one allowed it but restricted it to particular geographical areas. 9
Twelve states forbid branching altogether3 0 Burton Barnes has suggested
that contemporary restrictive branching policies in the domestic context
stem from the 1930s, when there was fear that a concentrated banking industry would result in anticompetitive monopolistic tendencies threatening
"competitive equality" under the U.S. dual banking system.' As in the case
of merger policy under the antitrust laws, 32 however, such a per se approach
to the problem ran the risk of denying the realization of economies of scale
and often obscured the economic realities. Thus, with respect to antibranching rules, a former head of the Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division has written that
These restrictive rules are supported by a lot of excited rhetoric
about "concentration" and "monopoly" which requires careful
analysis. Highly restrictive state laws may limit statewide "concentration" at the price of protecting local "monopolies." Less restrictive measures - including greater reliance on anti-trust laws - are
available to protect against undue concentration, coercive
restraints, and predatory practices."
In recent years, given the influx of foreign banks, the worry has been that
large foreign banks will gain entry into domestic state markets, thereby
competing with state banks at the retail credit level since these large banks
will necessarily have a lower cost of funds.34 At the same time, the large U.S.
national banks favor such expansion, as a substantial amount of their
profits are generated from banking activities abroad. 3 Consequently, these
large national banks are hesitant to support restrictions on foreign banking
activity in the United States lest foreign countries adopt similar restrictive
practices in retaliation.6
29. Barnes, The Fine Edge of Prohibition: Interstate and Foreign Banking in the United
States, 91 Banking L.J. 911, 912 (1976).
30. Id

31. Id. at 914.
32. For the most recent discussion by the Supreme Court of merger policy which
specifically rejects a per se approach in favor of particularistic inquiry into the economics of the
situation see Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 4828 (1977).
33. Barnes, supra note 29, at 916-17.
34. Festetics, Strategic Considerationsfor Foreign Bank Expansion, 9 Colom. J. World

Business 81 (1974).
35. See Regulation Looming For U.S. Banks Abroad, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1977, at 1, col.
4 (80 percent of Citibank's profits are from overseas banking interests).

36. See, e.g., Reimpell, U.S. Plans to Restrict ForeignBanks Leave a Bad Taste in German
Mouths, Euromoney 61, 62 (Sept. 1976).
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Fed Chairman Arthur Burns commented that the antibranching provisions of section 5 of H.R. 13876 (the International Banking Act of 1976), the
language of which was virtually identical to that in H.R. 7325's section 5,
sought "to equalize the ground rules for interstate banking competition between large domestic banks and foreign banks. . . The Board prefers section 5 of H.R. 13876 in its present form because it would. . . be more consistent with the principle of national treatment."37 The plain fact is,
however, that "large domestic banks" see no need for such restrictive
legislation. In its 1976 position paper on H.R. 13876, the New York State
Banking Department, the department in whose jurisdiction are located such
banks as Citicorp and Chase Manhattan, supported "the continuation of
the existing authority for interstate banking despite the fact that the International Banking Act's ban on interstate branching by foreign banks might,
in a limited way, benefit New York."38 The benefit would be obvious: the
grandfathering provisions would create a comparative domestic advantage
for those financial centers having already accommodated foreign banking
operations.3 9 Similarly, Carl Schmitt, California's bank superintendant,
wrote to Congressman Rousselot charging that the bill's restrictions on multistate branching "will impair California's development as an international
40
financial center."
From an economic standpoint the argument that foreign banks should
be subject to restrictive branching regulations because of fear of undueconcentration or adverse competition is analogous to the contemporary arguments against allowing foreign imports of steel and shoes, for example, to
compete with U.S. producers of these items. Assuming away instances of
predatory pricing or dumping, both of which can be dealt with under the
countervailing duty4 ' and anti-dumping42 sections of the Foreign Trade Act
of 1974,11 foreign imports competing purely in terms of their efficiency in
their means of production provide a competitive stimulus to U.S. firms and
a general consumer welfare benefit to U.S. purchasers. Forbidding these imports on non-economic, non-efficiency grounds denies U.S. consumers the
realization of these efficiencies and established a negative precedent in terms
37. H.R. Jour. H 7948 (July, 1976) (debate on International Banking Act of 1976) [herein.
after, Journal].
38. Id. at H7936, H 7952.
39. See the priniciples articulated by the New York State Banking Department for the
regulation of foreign banks in id. at H.R. 7951.

40. Id.
41. A countervailing duty is a duty imposed by an importing country to offset directly a
trade preference accorded a particular export by the exporting country. See, 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(Supp. V 1975).

42. Anti-dumping provisions may be imposed to prevent the practice of an exporter's selling goods in a foreign market below cost in order to practice predatory pricing as a means to
generate monopoly profits. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. V 1975).

43. Codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. V. 1975).
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of trade liberalization. Insofar as foreign banking activities in the United
States are involved, there is little to fear either in terms of excessive concentration or unfair competition. As the New York State Banking Department
explained in 1976, "[fjoreign banking organizations . . .have established
rather limited banking activities across state lines. For one thing, any
foreign bank which has established a full service bank in the U.S. is subject
to all of the restraints on interstate banking which the Bank Holding Act imposes on domestic banks."' 4
In summary, then, if foreign banks operating in the United States actually pose threats in terms of retail service competition with domestic
banks or in terms of potential excessive concentration, we already possess
the necessary legal machinery for regulating their activities just as we would
do for similarly situated domestic banks.
IV.

THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1977

Introduced on May 23, 1977 as H.R. 7325, the International Banking
Act of 1977 is intended "To provide for Federal regulation of participation
by foreign banks in domestic financial markets." 5 Its key provisions deal
with the establishment of Edge Act Corporations (Sec. 3), Federal branches
and agencies (Sec. 4), interstate banking operations (Sec. 5), and the regulation of certain "nonbanking activities" such as the underwriting and distribution of securities in the United States by foreign banks (Sec. 8). The
language of H.R. 7325 is virtually identical to that of H.R. 13876 which the
House of Representatives passed in 1976 but which languished in the Senate
at the end of the legislative session. Section 9 sets forth "guidelines for
foreign bank operations" stating that the Act "shall seek to achieve a parity
of treatment for foreign banks, branches, agencies, and commercial lending
companies relative to their domestic counterparts.' 6 Guidelines issued by
the Secretary of the Treasury "shall endeavor to foster participation by
foreign interests in international financial markets in the United States to
the maximum extent consistent with maintenance of fair and vigorous com-

petition in such markets.
A.

.

. .,7

Provisions affecting branching

Section 4(a) of H.R. 7325 states that, except as provided in section 5
(interstate banking operations), "a foreign bank may, with the approval of
the Comptroller, establish a Federal branch or agency in any State in which
(1) it is not operating a branch or agency pursuant to State law and (2) the
44.
45.
46.
47.

Journal.supra note 37 at 7952.
Hearings, supra note 21, at 3.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
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establishment of a branch or agency. . . by a foreign bank is not prohibited
by State law." 48 When the bill was marked up on October 13, 1977, section
4(a) was qualified to apply only to a foreign bank "which engages directly in
49
a banking business outside the United States."
Section 5(a) details the conditions under which foreign banks can
engage in branching:
Except as provided by subsection (b), no foreign bank may
operate a branch, agency, commercial lending company subsidiary, or bank subsidiary outside its home State unless (1) in the
case of a Federal or State branch, the State is one in which it could
operate a branch if it were a national bank located in its home
State, (2) in the case of a State branch, agency, or commercial
lending company, it is approved by the regulatory authority of the
State in which such State branch, agency, or commercial lending
company is to be operated, and (3) in the case of a Federal branch
or agency, its operation is not prohibited by the State in which it is
to be operated...50
Subsection (b) provides a grandfather clause for foreign bank branching activities "lawfully commenced" or properly "approved" by State authority
prior to May 1, 1976.11 The Report issued by the Committee on Banking,
Currency and Housing states that the bill has two main policy objectives: (1)
"to provide a system of Federal regulation of foreign banking activities,"
and (2) to provide "equal treatment" for foreign and domestic banks
52
operating in the United States. Section 5(a) would, theoretically, accomplish the latter goal by prohibiting foreign banks from branching unless
states provided equal treatment for national banks. In the markup session,
the Committee deleted the grandfathering provisions entirely and changed
section 5(a) by deleting subsection (1) and by requiring express permission
from a State in which a Federal branch or agency would be operated. The
overall effect is to sanction the status quo which leaves multistate branching
to the discretion of individual states.
B.

Rationalefor the provisions

At the present time, regulation of foreign banks in the United States is
left almost completely to the individual states. One argument frequently advanced against this approach is that the lack of a consistent, coherent treat48. Id. at 8.
49. H.R. 7325 § 4(a), at 7 (Comm. Print 1977).
50. Hearings, supra note 21, at 14-15.

51. Id. at 15.
52. Report from the Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing on HR. 13876, submitted on May 26, 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1193 at 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter

cited as Reportl.
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ment of bank branching results in "open inequality" which lets big foreign
banks establish offices in major financial capitals while denying this right to
domestic banks. 11In making its plea for broad federal regulation of foreign
banking, the Committee Report justifies its results "in view of the impact of
foreign banking institutions on domestic financial markets and the domestic
and foreign commerce of the United States, and because most foreign banks
4
operate in the United States in more than one state." The impact is never
analyzed in terms of whether it is positive or negative, and the merefact that
foreign banks have multistate operations can be positive in terms of
providing capital for regional development and offsetting U.S. balance of
payments deficits. The unarticulated empirical premises behind the antibranching provisions have a hollow ring reminiscent of the vague rationales
with which the Fed has been lobbying on behalf of this legislation for the
last three years.
Let us look at the empirical premises underlying the bill's general policy
objectives. Specifically we can isolate the following concerns which federal
restrictions on branching would supposedly remedy: (1) Competitive advantages of foreign banks, (2) inability of the Fed to implement a successful
U.S. monetary policy, and (3) fear that international credit flows through
foreign-owned branches will create increased political leverage for countries
having a petrodollar surplus.
1.

Competitive advantages

One of the overriding principles of U.S. policy toward foreign direct investment has been that of "national treatment," whereby foreign business
55
entities are accorded the same treatment as domestic businesses. The argument in vogue among supporters favoring restriction of branching rules is
that multistate branching grants foreign banks a competitive advantage. In
testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision,
Regulation and Insurance on H.R. 7325, William E. Whitesell, speaking on
behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, observed that "[t]o prevent what is perceived as a competitive advantage favoring foreign banks,
the bill would in fact discriminate against states other than New York and
56
By requiring
California in their international banking aspirations."
foreign banks to confine their operations to their "home" state unless
branching was allowed to national banks in a given state, the bill would effectively coerce foreign banks to locate in the developed financial centers.
Georgia, for example, with the support of then Governor Carter, in 1974
passed an International Banking Agency Act which was "aimed at ex53.
54.
55.
56.

Barnes, supra, note 29, at 926.
Report, supra note 52, at 2.
Hearings, supra note 21, at 267.
Id. at 315.
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panding Atlanta's role as an international financial center."57 In similar
testimony to that of Whitesell, Governor Busbee of Georgia challenged the
facts of the "comparative advantage" argument when he argued that
"[diomestic banks utilize a wide range of multistate bank holding company
bank and nonbank affiliates, Edge Act corporations, loan production offices, traveling loan and deposit-producing offices, and a nationwide
correspondent banking network to far outstrip foreign bank competition in
this area.""8 Furthermore, there is little indication that foreign banks in the
United States prefer to engage in the panoply of traditional consumeroriented banking services such as trust service, mortgages, credit-related insurance, ordinary checking and savings account business, and the supplying
of venture capital to small businesses. 9
Competitive advantage is one of the chief rationales behind the International Banking Act in general and the multistate branching provisions in
particular. The empirical evidence, however, as to the demonstrated validity
of this justification simply is not convincing. In light of this dilemma, until a
more convincing demonstration of the inequities created bymultistate
branching can be presented, this rationale should be abandoned. 0
2.

Fed control over monetary policy

If enacted as originally proposed, H.R. 7325 would permit the Fed to
establish reserve requirements and reporting obligations which currently are
not required by domestic state-chartered non-member banks. 61 In terms of
adherence to the original "equality of treatment" principle, such a provision
amounts to a radical departure from this objective. One of the alleged
reasons for this expanded requirement is that foreign banks should be considered as a "special category of banking institution" for which federal law
must "fill the gap" in the absence of State branching laws. 61 By offering this
viewpoint the U.S. Treasury appears to be in accordance with the Fed which
speculates that without such restrictions, its ability to implement successful
monetary policy will be thwarted by the likelihood that foreign banks could
escape any restrictive policy by drawing on the resources of their home offices. The problem with this rationale is that the Congress could easily create
a set of currency movement restrictions or controls to prohibit such massive
movements in potentially threatening contexts.
As part of the reason behind the Fed's argument, the increase in total
assets of foreign banks in the United States - some 172 percent during the
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 605.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 608.
See id. at 574.
See Platten, supra note 22, at 68.

62. Hearings, supra note 21, at 263.
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last five years - is cited.63 European banks have currently approximately
$30 billion in assets in this country, a growth of 329 percent since 1972.64
U.S. banks operating overseas branches and subsidiaries, on the other hand,
have assets of approximately $225 billion located in some 728 branches
abroad.' At the present, some 93 foreign banks maintain 210 foreign bank
operations in the United States, a 101 percent increase since 1972.66 Thus, in
comparison with the aggregate presence of U.S. banks overseas, that of
foreign banks in the United States is significantly smaller.
One of the vehicles by which the Fed attempts to regulate the domestic
money supply is Regulation M. 6 1 This provision requires that a U.S. bank
keep a reserve of 4 percent on foreign funds which are loaned to customers
in the United States. Most of these funds in the past have been
Eurodollars; 68 however, there is recent evidence that an increasing amount
of foreign investment in the United States may be coming from the Far
East. 69 Since foreign banks are not members of the Federal Reserve System,
they do not have to comply with this reserve requirement, and the conclusion drawn by many observers is that this situation "gives a bank that is
loaning dollars raised in the Euromarket an automatic price edge of between
an eighth and a quarter." ' 70 In 1973, during a brief monetary crisis, Fed
Chairman Burns requested foreign banks in the United States to comply
voluntarily with Reg M. For the most part, the foreign banks complied with
the Chairman's request.7 The countervailing position against the Fed's
position as regards foreign banks, however, is that U.S. banks are able to
avoid the restraints of Reg. M, thereby defeating the Fed's overall policy of
monetary control over the flow of foreign funds:
"Reg M," says an Italian banker, "was created to be avoided."
Yet American banks also easily avoid Reg M by crediting
Eurodollar loans to the account of European offices of American
corporations, which then transfer the money back to the U.S. "Except for some small U.S. banks that don't have access to the
Euromarket," says a government economist, "nobody really has
an important cost-of-funds advantage over anyone else." 72
63. Id. at 578.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 579.

66. Id. at 578.
67, 12 C.F.R. §213 (1977). See also Lichtenstein, Foreign Participation in United States
Banking: Regulatory Myths and Realities. 15 B.C. Indus. & Corn. L. Rev. 879 (1974).
68. Welles, Bankers. Bankers Everywhere - But How Much Business are they Getting?,

Institutional Investor 115, 130 (Sept. 1977).
69. Lachica & Lipsky, Japan is Changing into Capital Source for Foreign Governments,
Corporations, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1978 at 14, col. 1.
70. Welles, supra note 68, at 130.

71. Id.
72. Id.
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Once again, the principle of national treatment and the empirical data show
the rationale for the bill's restrictions on foreign banking activities in the
United States to be unwarranted. Although legally free from the necessity of
compliance with Reg M, foreign banks do not gain either a competitive advantage or the power to "end run" U.S. monetary policy. The Fed has simply failed to make its case.
One of the principal reasons behind the growth of foreign banking
operations in the United States is the relative absence of "any elements of
'country-risk' associated with dollar investments in banking facilities outside the United States." 73 Foreign banks' deposits in the United States
reflect both the relative stability of the U.S. investment climate and the
desire by foreign banks to service industries from home in their trade relations with the United States. As essentially "service facilities," foreign banks
in this country still need to retain a certain level of demand balances in order
to carry on routine clearing and settlements activities. Demand balances,
then, function in part "as compensation for services rendered" by U.S.
banks for correspondent activities. 4 Under the present regulatory
framework, foreign banks operating in New York, California, and Illinois
must comply with State reserve requirements "similar in magnitude to
Federal Reserve requirements, but which can be satisfied by demand
balances at domestic banks.""3 According to Terrell and Key, however, the
requirement that U.S. offices of foreign banks must join the Federal Reserve
System would mean that "their demand for these balances would be reduced
substantially because they would satisfy their reserve requirements through
balances at Federal Reserve banks, and their access to Federal Reserve services would reduce their need to hold demand balances as compensation for
correspondent services." 7 Once again, federal regulation in this area would
be preemptive of state control, and the overall impact would be negative in
terms of the correspondent relationships between foreign and state banks.
3.

Political leverage through currency flows

The presence of foreign banking operations in the United States is not
something new. The Rothschilds established an agency in San Francisco in
1849, to be followed in 1875 by the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank. Canadian banks began operations in the United States in the 1880s." Only since
the massive problems created by the need to recycle petrodollars have
become politically salient, however, has there been any serious concern over
the increasing presence of foreign capital in this country. Best-sellers such as
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Terrell & Key, supra note 10, at 8.
Id. at 10
Id. at 9-10.
Id.
Terzakis, How to Regulate Foreign Banks?. Banking 72, 72 (July 1976).
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Paul Erdman's The Crash of 1979 speculate as to the consequences of a
politically-motivated major funds transfer of OPEC nations out of the U.S.
banking system. The problem with Erdman's scenario, however, is its
assumption that OPEC nations would willingly jeopardize their own
reserves by wrecking the international monetary system. Furthermore, he
fails to explain just where OPEC nations would deposit such large amounts
of money outside the United States in a fashion which would keep it out of
the U.S. economy. In other words, assuming a stable and vibrant U.S.
economy in the near future, the initial decision to export capital to the United States is unlikly to be reversed for political reasons as long as the U.S.
economy is strong.
Supporters of the International Banking Act of 1977 seem to feel that
the problem of foreign capital coming into the United States is a direct
offshoot of the problem of recycling petrodollars. Since recycling is a
"global" problem, so the argument goes, individual states have no role to
play in the outcome. As James J. Terzakis has observed, "[t]he Fed has
taken the position that a national perspective as to foreign banks is essential,
and that that perspective can only be effective on the federal level. ' "' This
national perspective, however, is premised largely on a set of fears which are
primarily speculative. Aside from the investment opportunities offered by
U.S. businesses, the predominant reasons behind the presence of foreign
banks in this country are fourfold: (1) To obtain presence in the U.S. capital
and industrial market, (2) to gather information for their own country's
overseas businesses, (3) to keep up with their competition, and (4) to service
business interests of U.S. corporations with foreign interests and vice versa.
If a problem exists in this area, it is one involving attitudes and not
political leverage. For the first time in recent history, countries other than
the United States are becoming capital exporters. For American sensibilities, a significant foreign presence in this country is an unusual
phenomenon. 9 By way of contrast, Germany has thirteen banks from six
American states doing business. As one writer has stated, the general timing
of H.R. 7325 is poor because "it happens when the one-way flow of
American investment abroad is turning into a reciprocal two-way flow. Yet
this evolution should be seen as beneficial to U.S. worldwide business interests." 80 From a purely domestic standpoint, H.R. 7325 is being considered within the context of a national debate about free trade and the
alleged "perils" of foreign competition.8" For these reasons, the timing is
78. Id. at 74.
79. See J. Higham, Strangers in the Land (1963) for a discussion of xenophobia in
American history.
80. Reimpell, supra note 36, at 62.
81. See Conderacci, Rising Pressurefor Protectionism,Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1977, at 8, col.
4, and Dewar, Meany Calls Free Trade A 'Myth,' Urges Strict Imports Control Plan, Wash.
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poor, and final action on the bill should be delayed until the domestic
political climate is more settled. Action which is at best hasty and based on
speculation about the competitive effects of foreign banks in the United
States runs the risk of foreign retaliation, especially if the intended legisla2
tion "goes beyond what is considered fair treatment."
V.

THE FUTURE OF MULTISTATE BRANCHING AND H.R. 7325

The markup session on H.R. 7325 resulted in elimination of the
prohibitions on multistate branching through the use of language which
deleted the provisions requiring equal treatment as to branching for
national banks. The bill as reported out of committee also requires express
permission by a State before a foreign bank can set up a Federal branch or
agency in a particular State. The Fed originally had proposed "that direct
imposition of the branching restrictions of the McFadden Act should be
limited to Federal branches and agencies. '"" As initially intended, the
legislation would have meant that future foreign branches and agencies
located outside the State where their main office was situated had to be
federally chartered.8 4 Section 5 of H.R. 7325, as it stands after the markup
session, represents a complete rejection of the Fed's position. Judging by the
testimony presented at the July 1977 hearings, the interests of the foreign
86
banks,8" the large U.S. banks having international and global operations,
and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors87 had the most persuasive effect.
Without the provisions limiting multistate branching, has the International Banking Act of 1977 lost its overriding raison d'etre? The remaining key sections of the bill deal with other issues which are also of import to
foreign banks seeking entry into the United States. Section 6(a), as amended
after the markup, requires the "[n]o foreign bank may establish or operate
a Federal branch unless the branch is an insured branch as defined in section
3(s) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act."8 8 This requirement is discriminatory and violative of the equal treatment premise behind foreign
bank regulation. Furthermore, it imposes an extra cost-of-funds element
which U.S. banks are exempt from if they choose to be. Similarly, section
8(c)'s inclusion of foreign banks within the Glass-Steagall prohibitions
against commercial banks undertaking investment banking activities could
well contravene a number of the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
82. Reimpell, supra note 36, at 62.
83. Hearings, supra note 21, at 39.

84. Reimpell, supra note 36, at 62.
85. Hearings, supra note 21, at 336-38, 341, 374, 431, 445.

86. Id. at 294, 296
87. Id. at 309.
88. See H.R. 7325, § 6(a), at 18 (Committee Print 1977).
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Navigation 9 signed by the United States and several of its trading partners.
Before this provision becomes operative - and regardless of the use of
grandfathering provisions to cushion its impact - attention should be paid
to any potential treaty violations. Part of the problem here stems from the
fact that foreign banks often have significantly different operating structures
from U.S. banks, and any attempt to regulate their dealings in the U.S.
securities market must take into account that in most foreign countries,
banks can perform both investment and commercial banking activities. 90
Perhaps the proponents of this section of H.R. 7325 would be advised to
consult with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to develop
an approach which can accommodate the foreign banks as concerning these
particular non-banking activities.
One can readily note that the directional outlook of this legislation is
both national and international: the standard for domestic comparison is
taken to be "equality of treatment" while from an international standpoint
the bill is meant to facilitate the functioning of "the international payments
mechanism and implementation of reciprocal arrangements with other
countries to strengthen international trade." 9' The chief difficulty with the
bill in its current form, however, is that these standards are by no means
commonly accepted. Providing "equality of treatment" necessarily means
allocating more power to federal regulation of domestic banking activities,
thereby undermining the present dual banking system; however, such a major change should stem from a much broader effort to restructure the entire
system of U.S. banking regulations. H.R. 7325 suffers, then, from a
bureaucratic schizophrenia to the extent that it endeavors to erect standards
at a time when the regulation of the U.S. domestic banking industry is, according to many observers, badly in need of major overhauling.
A simple example relevant to the multistate branching issue will illustrate this point. As explained earlier, anti-branching rules were justified
as necessary means to guarantee competition in order to lessen the
likelihood of excessive concentration. 2 Within the last two decades, changes
in commuting and hiring patterns and the invention of electronic fundtransfer systems (EFTS) along with customer-bank communication terminals (CBCTS) have enabled domestic banking institutions to engage in essentially interstate activities. These technological changes alone have
created an environment which suggests the relaxation of strict antibranching
89. For instance, Peter Reimpell suggests that the bill's "retroactive application of a new
law to well-established operations" might be contrary to the German-American Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 36, at 62. See also Treaty with the
Netherlands on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, March 27, 1956, art. VII, paras. I & 2,
8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942 (effective Dec. 5, 1957).
90. See Hearings, supra note 21, at 341, 344.
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rules. 93 Similarly, the rise of debit cards in accessing credit balances located
out of state have given finance companies and retailers expanded opportunities. Savings and loan associations have recently become active in lobbying for interstate branching, and regional banks, attuned to increased opportunities of obtaining capital, have been active setting up out-of-state
Edge Act corporations.94 These recent developments in the domestic banking arena suggest that the concept of restrictive branching is seriously in
question. Consequently, it makes little sense to establish regulation of
foreign branching activities on the basis of "equality of treatment" when
that same domestic standard is itself in flux. 9"
VI.

CONCLUSION

Both politicians and economists have realized that future world
prosperity requires positive adaptation to economic interdependence. As
Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, has
stated, "[flour conditions . . . are critical to a well-functioning world
economy:" economic growth, efficiency, equity, and adaptability. 96 Cooper
has also been the most recent advocate of an "open international economic
system" in recognizing that "[w]e all have a stake in insuring that international flows of capital, goods, services, and technology continue to move
competitively according to fundamentally liberal economic principles."" In
order to comply with these principles and Cooper's four conditions, the attitude of the United States government must be one of neutrality, thereby
allowing foreign investors and bankers to make their decisions on the basis
of relevant economic criteria rather than in light of "structural rigidities"
meant to dissuade the presence of foreign economic entities from American
entry by making their operations more costly. The real issue at stake in H.R.
7325 concerns the degree to which the United States is willing to open its
doors to foreign capital and foreign banking activities so as to grant effective reciprocity of treatment. The justifications offered by the Fed, H.R.
7325's chief sponsor, are not only ambiguous in light of the available em-

93. See Guenther, supra note 6, at 1146.
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pirical data, but also implicate a whole series of different concerns relating
to the restructuring of U.S. banking laws. One commentator has surmised
that
with no clear definition either here or abroad of what constitute
"banking" and "non-banking" activities, mutual nondiscrimination as a principle may even be a misnomer. If the world
is an international banking market, inseparable as to its components, even the seemingly middle-of-the-road approach of the Fed
loses its point.9"
George Sharp, an international banker with Citicorp, defines the entire issue
as "a non-problem area," 99 while a member of the New York State Banking
Department calls the legislation "overkill." Even the manager of the West
Deutsche Landesbank Girozentrale branch in New York suggests that
foreign bank regulation should evolve within the context of a new domestic
banking structure: "You should first try to set up a totally new banking
system, then find out how foreign banks would fit into it."' 10
Tracing the history of foreign banking legislation in the United States
yields the inevitable conclusion that the Fed's concerns are really a byproduct of the series of shocks created by the OPEC price hike in 1973. This
essay has explored the ways in which the main provisions of H.R. 7325
would restrict the activities of foreign banks in the United States. In light of
these evaluations, the author suggests the following conclusions:
(1) The legislation should be scrapped, primarily because the Fed
has simply failed to justify its case.
(2) the provisions governing the non-banking activities of foreign
banks in the United States - in particular, investment banking activities - should be dealt with by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the rubric of the Glass-Steagall
Act.
(3) the proposed change in the National Banking Act allowing up
to one-half of the directors of a national bank to be foreigners
is a valuable change which should be instituted.
(4) requiring membership of foreign branches, etc. in the Federal
Reserve System is discriminatory and violative of both the
equal treatment and mutual non-discrimination theories of
foreign bank regulation in the United States.
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(5) H.R. 7325 is really a domestic banking act which attempts to
deal with the presence of foreign banks in this country. Since
the case for purely federal, as opposed to state regulation, has
not been convincingly articulated and since the main provisions limiting multistate branching have been cut out of the
proposed bill, the legislation has lost its chief raison d'dtre.
International financial markets are still reacting with uncertainty to a
number of recent developments stemming from the six-fold increase of oil
prices since 1973. The International Banking Act of 1977 represents a unilateral approach to a multinational dilemma. Recently, George Meany has
voiced support of such a one-sided approach to international economic
policy, emphasizing "fair" trade rather than free trade. Calling free trade "a
joke and a myth," Meany urges "a strict imports-control policy" in order to
"do unto others as they do to us, barrier for barrier, closed door for closed
door."'' Ignoring the fallacies of this protectionist attitude, we can conclude with an observation that even by Meany's own standard, the provisions of H.R. 7325 concerning multistate branching should quite properly
be abandoned since their passage would, in effect, erect barriers in the United States when there are no similiar barriers imposed abroad. If the
worries articulated by the Fed ever do become serious enough to require the
passage of legislation, the United States should respond by taking action
through existing international organizations such as the OECD or UNCTAD. Unilateral action runs the risk not only of retaliation from abroad
but also of creating the impression that the United States openly talks free
trade while practicing protectionism.
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